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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VALI CONVALESCENT AND
CARE INSTITUTIONS, a Utah
Corporation,

!

Petitioner/Appellant,

i

!

-VS-

J

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING,

i

Case No. 880434-CA
S

Respondent/Cross Appellant, i

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/CROSS APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from the final order of the Honorable
Michael R. Murphy, Judge, Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
affirming the Final Determination of the Executive Director of
the Department of Health.
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code
Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1987).

The appeal of the administrative

hearing decision to the Third District Court was pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. S 26-23-2(3) (1987, Supp.).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In addition to the two issues Appellant Vali has
presented for review regarding its claim for interest on the
amount of a settlement between the parties# Respondent Department
of Health, Division of Health Care Financing (DHCF) presents the
following issue:
Did the settlement that the parties orally
agreed to on March 20, 1985 and confirmed in
writing on March 22, 1985, bar, or otherwise
render unenforceable, Vali's later claim for
interest for the period prior to the
settlement?
A ruling in favor of DHCF on either the issues
presented by Vali or on the issue presented by DHCF would dispose
of the case and render consideration of the other issue(s)
unnecessary.
STATMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is Vali's attempt to get pre-settlement
interest on the amount of a settlement between the parties, which
amount was compromised, settled, and paid in full prior to
initiation of litigation.

At the time the underlying dispute

arose, nursing homes in Utah were paid a certain number of
dollars per patient per day by the Division of Health Care
Financing (DHCF) for nursing home services provided to Medicaid
recipients.

The rates for each nursing home facility were

calculated according to regulations of DHCF and were based
principally on cost data supplied by each nursing home on its
annual Facility Cost Profile (FCP).

The nursing homes were paid

monthly pursuant to the rates in effect.
to adjustment on audit of the FCPs.
2-

The rates were subject

The underlying dispute arose when independent auditors
found that Vali, a provider of Medicaid nursing home services,
had significantly overstated its allowable costs on certain FCPs
that Vali had submitted.

Vali disagreed with the audit findings

and requested an informal hearing, which commenced a rather
lengthy series of conferences and meetings in an attempt to
resolve differences and agree to a final settlement of the audit
without the necessity of litigation in a formal administrative
hearing.

The parties reached a final compromised settlement

agreement on or about March 22, 1985.

The rates were adjusted

and final settlement calculated.
About two weeks after March 22, 1985, Vali raised the
issue of interest for the first time.

About a week later the

parties met to discuss how the interest issue should be handled.
At that meeting DHCF was informed by Vali that, in its opinion,
the issue of interest had not been settled by the informal
hearing.

Vali was informed by representatives of DHCF that, in

their opinion, the question of interest was settled by the
informal hearing.

The parties reached no agreement at that

meeting except an agreement to disagree.

Pursuant to the

compromised settlement agreement of March 22, 1985, and without
revoking its position that interest was settled by the informal
hearing, DHCF thereafter tendered a check for the full settlement
amount to Vali.

Vali accepted the check and negotiated it,

though Vali did not specifically rescind its contention that
interest had not been settled.

-3-

Thereafter the dispute regarding interest was submitted
to a formal administrative hearing officer who found in his
recommended decision that Vali was entitled to interest.

That

decision was based largely on the Utah Procurement Code (Utah
Code. Ann. S 63-56-1 et seq). The Executive Director of the
Department of Health then entered her Final Determination holding
in part that the statute relied on by Vali did not apply and that
Vali was not entitled to interest.

The matter was appealed to

the Third District Court where the Final Determination of the
Executive Director was affirmed.

Vali no longer asserts that it

is entitled to interest under the statute relied on by the
Administrative Law Judge but continues to. assert that it is
entitled to interest under two other statutes.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Respondent/Cross Appellant DHCF is the state agency

responsible for the administration of the Medicaid program
pursuant to Title XIX of the Federal Social Security Act.
2.

Appellant Vali was an owner and operator of nursing

homes and provided nursing home services to Medicaid recipients
at the time the original dispute arose.

However, Vali sold its

nursing homes prior to requesting an informal hearing and was not
a Medicaid provider at the time the parties settled their dispute
(R. 157) and Formal Hearing Transcript, p. 26 In 23.
3.

The Medicaid regulations require that within 90

days after the close of each fiscal year every nursing home must
file a report of its actual "allowable costs" for the fiscal
year.

That report is referred to as a Facility Cost Profile or

4-

FCP.

The Medicaid program specifies what costs are allowable.

Medicaid State Plan, Attachment 4.19D S§ 330, 332, and 500
(1979).
4.

The State Plan requires that

M

[unallowable costs

should not be claimed on the FCPM, and that the provider "is
primarily responsible for the accuracy and appropriateness of the
reported information."

Medicaid State Plan, Attachment 4.19D, S

331 (1979).
5.

At the time this action arose, the allowable costs

reported in a facilities FCP were used to determine that
facility's per patient per day prospective payment rate for later
periods.

Medicaid State Plan, Attachment 4.19D, S 920 (1979).
6.

In December of 1979 or January of 1980, Vali

submitted its long overdue FCPs for the period from January 1,
1978 to June 30, 1978 (approximately 15 months late), and its
slightly overdue FCP for the period of July 1, 1978 to June 30,
1979 (approximately 3 months late).

Stipulation of Facts,

paragraph 1.
7.

Based on review of those FCPs, auditors of the

independent accounting firm of Main Hurdman determined that a
substantial portion of the costs reported on those FCPs were not
"allowable costs" within the Medicaid program (R. 106).
8.

Because those FCPs were submitted late and because

they contained disallowances, the Division of Health Care
Financing (DHCF) was not able to use them at the time that it was
necessary to calculate Vali's prospective payment rate.

DHCF,

therefore, calculated an interim rate that would be paid to Vali

-5-

until the audit was settled.

The interim rate was based on past

reports submitted by Vali's facilities, inflated forward (R.
105).
9.

At such time as the dispute regarding the above-

mentioned FCP's could be settled, DHCF would then use the settled
FCP's to recalculate the prospective payment rates regarding Vali
and make any adjustments that might be necessary, whether it be
for overpayments or for underpayments (R. 105).
10.

The Bureau of Medicaid Fraud, Department of Public

Safety, undertook an investigation of Petitioner early in 1980.
Stipulation of Facts, paragraph 2.
11.

Settlement negotiations between the parties in

relation to disputed claims were stayed pending the conclusion of
that investigation.
12.

Stipulation of Facts, paragraph 2.

At the conclusion of that investigation, the

Bureau of Medicaid Fraud determined that there was insufficient
evidence to support criminal charges.

Stipulation of Facts,

Exhibit A.
13.

After the Medicaid Fraud investigation was

completed on April 22, 1982, the Rate Reimbursement Specialist in
the Department of Health recalculated the rates to be paid to the
nursing homes that were operated by Vali, and informed Vali of
those recalculations in letters that were sent to the facilities
under dates of May 5, 1982 and May 10# 1982 (R. 141-148).
14.

Vali disagreed with the amounts and, almost a year

later, on March 25, 1983 submitted its request for an informal
administrative hearing (R. 157).
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15.

That hearing was scheduled for April 19, 1983.

Pursuant to requests from Vali, the date of that hearing was
rescheduled several times and was eventually held on July 28,
1983 (R. 158-162).
16.

The total amount Vali claimed as allowable costs

for its four nursing homes on the above-mentioned FCPs was
approximately 3.9 million dollars. After months of negotiations
between the parties in their efforts to resolve their dispute
without formal litigation, the portion of that sum that continued
to be disallowed was a little more than $768,000.00 (R. 166-171).
17.

The final session of the informal hearing took

place on March 20, 1985. As a result of,that meeting the parties
agreed that an additional $60,000.00 of the disallowance would be
allowed, making the final disallowance a little more than
$708,000 (R. 174) and Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit I.
18.

At that meeting the parties orally agreed to a

proposed final settlement of their dispute.

Uncontroverted

evidence shows that at that meeting Mr. Brown (the principal of
Vali) affirmed that the proposed settlement would "dispose of
every claim which [he had] against the Health Department" and
that he would go his way and the Department would go its way
"without having to deal with each other over money again."
Formal Hearing Transcript, Exhibit S-l Paragraph 5.
19.

After that meeting, the hearing officer put the

terms that the parties had agreed to into written form (letter
and attachments dated March 25, 1985), and proposed them for
Vali's approval as final settlement.

7-

In the proposed settlement

the hearing officer stated, "I propose the following as final
settlement in the Vali Care and Convalescent Centers issues."
Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit H, p. 6, and Exhibit I.
20.

Mr. Brown (the principal of Vali) went to the

Health Department and picked up that proposed settlement on March
22, 1985. On that same day Mr. Brown confirmed, in writing, his
acceptance of the Department's offer for final settlement by a
letter in which he wrote:
Mr. Don Hampton and I have reviewed the
contents of your letters of March 18 and 25
(picked up March 22) containing your
findings as informal hearing officer of the
Valley Care Center Audit review.
Therein, you expressed a desire to expedite
a final resolve in these matters; so too do
we. Therefore, in an attempt to resolve
without further discussion at the
administrative hearing level; I am informing
you of our decision to accept your findings
as contained in the two (2) aforementioned
letters. This settlement, while
compromised, is a fair one and I appreciate
your efforts in carrying it to this point.
Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit K.
21.

About two weeks after the settlement agreement was

entered into, Vali raised the issue of interest for the first
time as the parties attempted to draft a mutual release.

Formal

Hearing Transcript, p. 83.
22.

On May 13, 1985, the parties met to discuss the

issue of interest.

Regarding that meeting, the Stipulation of

Facts herein states:
[at that] meeting. . . the DHCF was informed
by the claimant that, in his opinion, the
issue of interest had not been settled by
the informal hearing. The claimant was
informed by representatives of the DHCF
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that, in their opinion, the question of
interest was settled by the informal
hearing.
Stipulation of Facts, p. 4, paragraph 21.
23.

The parties left that meeting with the issue of

interest unresolved and with nothing more than an agreement to
disagree, each party holding fast to its respective position as
stated in the Stipulation of Facts and agreeing only that the
issue of whether interest was settled by the settlement agreement
would have to be resolved through litigation.

Formal Hearing

Transcript, p. 22 et seq.
24.

Respondent thereafter delivered a check for the

full settlement amount to Vali.

Stipulation of Facts, p. 5,

paragraph 23.
25.

Vali negotiated the check and filed a request for

a formal hearing to resolve its claim regarding interest.
Stipulation of Facts, p. 5, paragraphs 24 and 25.
26.
judge.

A hearing was held before an administrative law

The recommended decision of the administrative law judge

was in favor of granting interest to Vali (R. 19-25).
27.

The record including the transcript of the

hearing, the stipulation of facts, the exhibits, the briefs of
the parties and the recommended decision of the administrative
law judge was then forwarded to the Executive Director of the
Department of Health for her review and final order.

The

Executive Director entered her Final Determination that Vali was
not entitled to interest (R. 16-18).
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28.

Vali then appealed to the Third District Court.

After extensive briefing and oral argument, that court entered
its order affirming the Final Determination of the Executive
Director that Vali is not entitled to interest (R. 229-237, 281283, 304-305).
29.

Vali then appealed to this Honorable Court and the

Department of Health cross-appealed (R. 306-307, 313-314).
RESPONSE TO VALI'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Form 271-A referred to in paragraph 1 of Vali's

statement of Facts (hereinafter referred to as "Vali's Facts") is
not an itemized statement "with fees for services" as Vali
claims.

Payment was not made on a fee for services basis but

rather pursuant to an established rate per patient per day.

Form

271-A simply contained an itemized list of Medicaid recipients
that resided in the facility during the month, the number of days
they resided there, the level of care and rate they were entitled
to, the total reimbursement the facility was entitled to (the
applicable rate times the number of days in residence for each
patient), the amount of the total reimbursement that would be
paid by third party insurers, etc., and the amount of the total
reimbursement that would be paid by Medicaid.
a Facility Cost Profile (FCP).
of the controversy herein.

Form 271-A is not

It is the FCPs that are the cause

Since the record contains no evidence

or contention to the contrary, it must be assumed that Vali
submitted Form 271-A each month for each of its nursing homes and
that Vali was timely paid each month pursuant to those Form 271A'e.
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2.

In response to paragraph 2 of Vali's Facts, the

Facility Cost Profiles do not contain "fees for services" as
claimed by Vali.

Rather they contain the "costs" that Vali

claimed were allowable costs based on the cost reimbursement
manual.

As indicated in DHCF's Statement of Facts, those costs

were used to set the per patient per day rate for later periods,
which rates were subject to adjustment after audit of the FCPs.
3.

In response to paragraph 3 of Vali's Facts, it is

likely that under normal circumstances the audits, hearings,
etc.; would have been completed by July 1, 1980 but contrary to
Vali's suggestion, payment of the settlement amount would not
have been made by that date because it would not have been due.
The FCPs were used to calculate rates for later periods, as
pointed out in DHCF's Statement of Facts.

Furthermore, the

reason circumstances were not normal was because Vali grossly
overstated its claims.
4.

In response to paragraph 4 of Vali's Facts, the

Bureau of Medicaid Fraud did not state that "there was no
evidence to support any charges that VALI had filed false or
inaccurate FCPs" (Emphasis added) as claimed by Vali.

Rather the

Bureau stated that there was "insufficient evidence to support
criminal charges against Richard Brown or any of the principals .
. . ."

Exhibit A to Stipulation of Facts, emphasis added.

As

the Court is well aware, fraud can be one of the most difficult
of criminal cases to prove.

Evidence may be insufficient to

support "criminal charges" for any of a number of reasons and yet
the same evidence may still show wrongfulness, inaccuracies or

-11

falsehood.

Vali's claims as to the statement made by the Bureau

of Medicaid Fraud are inaccurate, misleading and untrue.
5.

In paragraph 5 of Vali's Facts, Vali claims that

the Bureau of Medicaid Fraud seized virtually every business
document Vali possessed, that only part of those documents were
returned and that those that were returned were in such disarray
as to be virtually worthless without a major effort at
reconstruction.

In citing to the record, Vali cites the Third

District Court's Memorandum Decision, as if to suggest that the
Court had made such a finding.
finding.

The Court did not make such a

Rather, after noting that Vali sought and received

several extensions of time, the Court simply stated:

"Vali

suggests that the extensions were necessary as a result of the
fraud investigators' disruption of its business documents."
Memorandum Decision p. 2.

Emphasis added.

Hence the Court did

not make such a finding but simply restated Vali's allegation.
Furthermore, based on information supplied by the Bureau of
Medicaid Fraud, the Department of Health would vigorously contest
Vali's allegations that their documents were not returned or
returned in disarray.

(R. 8, paragraph 2.)

Even if the alleged facts stated in paragraphs 4 and 5
of Vali's Facts were true, they are irrelevant to Vali's case
against the Department of Health.

The Bureau of Medicaid Fraud

is in the Department of Public Safety and the Department of
Health has no control over the Department of Public Safety.
Hence, Vali's cause of action, if any they have, should be

-12-

against the Bureau of Medicaid Fraud.
6.

In response to paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of Vali's

Facts, Vali quotes the hearing officer out of context and
conveniently drops the "However" from the original quote so that
it would appear that there was a reservation of rights in the
proposed settlement that would allow Vali to raise the interest
question for the first time after the settlement proposal was
accepted.

The full quote immediately follows the settlement

proposal and reads:
Both parties in this issue have indicated
that if they find this settlement
satisfactory, they will accept settlement at
the administrative hearing level.
However, both parties reserved the right to
raise any of the issues discussed in this
hearing, or any related issues not
necessarily discussed in the informal
hearing level jLf_ the conflict cannot be
resolved at the administrative review level.

In oral argument in the District Court, Vali argued that it did
not matter which Department it sued because ultimately the money
comes from the State. But it does make a difference. The case
Vali would have to prove against Medicaid Fraud is quite
different than the case against the Department of Health.
Moreover, each Department has its own separate budget. If
Medicaid Fraud caused harm to Vali, then Medicaid Fraud should
pay, not Health. Furthermore, since the Federal government
reimburses the State for approximately 73% of the cost of
Medicaid-covered medical services but does not reimburse the
State for interest, if the State pays interest, they pay not only
on State dollars but also on federal dollars. In addition, any
money paid out to interest is not available for medical care. If
it is not spent on medical care, the State also loses the Federal
match that could have been claimed had the money been spent on
medical care. The result is that for every $100,000.00 taken out
of the Department of Health budget to pay interest, the State's
Medicaid program loses about $370,370.00 that would otherwise be
available to fund much needed medical care for the poor of our
State. Hence it does make a difference which agency is sued. If
the Department of Health ends up paying interest it is the
medically needy poor who are the real losers. Vali's action, if
any, should be against the Bureau of Medicaid Fraud.
-13-

Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit H, p. 9.

Emphasis added.

Hence

the reservation of rights to raise issues applied only if the
settlement proposal was not accepted.

Since it was accepted,

there was no reservation of rights.
7.

In paragraph 10 of Vali's Facts, Vali claims that

as a resuit of the informal hearings and conferences a
determination was made that Vali was "entitled" to a certain
"principal" sum.

The exhibit relied on by Vali in support of

that claim makes no reference to Vali being entitled to anything
or to a principal amount but rather sets forth ". . .calculations
for the settlement. . ." and "The settlement results . . . "
(Stipulation of facts paragraph 17 and accompanying exhibit).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the District Court, Vali argued that it had a
statutory right to interest based upon any one of three specified
Utah statutes.

The Third District Court ruled against Vali on

all three statutes.
statutes.

Vali's appeal is based on two of those

The Department of Health's argument is simply that

neither of the statutes relied on by Vali apply in this case.
Though Vali has argued below that it does not seek
interest as damages, Vali now asserts that it does seek interest
as damages.

The Department of Health argues that it is not

permissible to raise a new issue on appeal and that even if it
were permissible, the law provides that acceptance of the
principal amount bars any claim for interest as damages.

Vali

did accept the full principal amount and is therefore barred from
now claiming interest.
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By way of cross-appeal, the Department of Health points
out that the final settlement was the result of compromise
between the parties.

Moreover, the Department's proposal for

settlement was, by its own terms, a proposal for final
settlement.

Vali did not reject the offer or even propose a

counter offer but simply accepted the offer as written, i.e., as
an offer for final settlement.

Hence, Vali could not thereafter

raise another claim.
Furthermore, the compromised settlement agreement was
binding on the parties and was substituted for the underlying
claims.

The compromise agreement barred any subsequent

litigation on the underlying claim.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 15-1-1, UTAH CODE ANN. CREATES NO
RIGHT OR ENTITLEMENT TO INTEREST; IT MERELY
ESTABLISHES THE LEGAL RATE
The first issue presented by Appellant in this appeal

Is interest awardable under Utah Code Ann.
S 15-1-1 where the principal sum due by
contract is resolved by the parties without
entry of formal judgment?
Utah Code Ann. S 15-1-1 states:
(1) Except when parties to a lawful
contract agree on a specified rate of
interest, the legal rate of interest for the
loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
Nothing in this section may be construed to
in any way affect any penalty or interest
charge which by law applies to delinquent or
other taxes or to any contract or
obligations made before May 14, 1981.

15-

(2) The parties to a lawful contract may
agree upon any rate of interest for the loan
or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose
in action.
In its Minute Entry of May 11, 1988, the Third District
Court, in this action, ruled:
Section 15-1-1, Utah Code Ann., on its face
creates no cause, claim, right or
entitlement; it merely establishes the legal
rate of interest.
The correctness of the Court's ruling is verified by a
brief examination of the legislative history of Section § 15-1-1,
and by a close reading of that statute.

Section 15-1-1 was first

enacted in 1907. At that time the common law in Utah already
provided for prejudgment interest as damages on amounts past due.
Godbe v. Young, 1 U. 55 (No date listed); Perry v. Taylor, 1 U.
63 (1871).

Hence, S 15-1-1 did not create any new right or even

codify an existing one.

Rather, S 15-1-1 simply set the rate at

which prejudgment interested would be assessed when a party had a
common law right to prejudgment interest or when the parties had
contracted for the payment of prejudgment interest but had not
agreed upon a rate.
A close reading of
true.

15-1-1 will verify that this is

There are no words requiring payment.

The statute does

not say "the debtor shall pay interest" or "the creditor is
entitled to interest."

Rather, it simply says "the legal rate of

interest . • . shall be 10% per annum."
interest is derived from the common law.
simply sets the rate.
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The right to the
The statute (S 15-1-1)

Since Utah Code Ann. S 15-1-1 in and of itself creates
no right or entitlement to interest, Vali is not entitled to
interest under that statute.

In order for Vali to be entitled to

interest at the rate set by § 15-1-1, Vali would have to show
that it is entitled to interest pursuant to principles of the
common law.
POINT II
VALI CLAIMED BELOW THAT INTEREST WAS SOUGHT
PURSUANT TO STATUTORY ENTITLEMENT AND NOT
PURSUANT TO THE COMMON LAW. VALI CANNOT NOW
CLAIM ENTITLEMENT TO INTEREST PURSUANT TO
THE COMMON LAW, BUT EVEN IF IT COULD, THE
COMMON LAW RULE OF EXTINGUISHMENT WOULD BAR
VALI'S CLAIM.
At the administrative hearing level, Vali argued that
[s]ince interest is being sought pursuant to
State statutes and not as general damages/
the general rule of extinguishment does not
apply.
Claimants Hearing Memorandum, p. 9 Emphasis added (R. 59). Thus,
Vali did not seek interest based on a theory of damages.

On the

contrary, Vali specifically argued that it did not seek interest
as damages but rather as an entitlement pursuant to certain State
statutes, BO as to avoid application of the general rule of
extinguishment.

(That rule provides that when interest is

claimed as damages, acceptance of the principal amount
extinguishes any claim for interest and that a separate suit for
interest as damages may not be maintained.)
Statutory entitlement, of course, was also the basis of
Vali's claim on appeal to the district court.

Again, in framing

its issues on appeal before this Honorable Court, Vali did not
claim interest as damages but rather argued only that it was

entitled to interest pursuant to State statutes.

Indeed, the

first time Vali claimed interest as damages was in response to
DOH's Motion for Summary Disposition in this Honorable Court.
The law in Utah is well settled that issues may not be
raised for the first time on appeal.

Franklin Financial v. New

Empire Develop. Co./ 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983).

Hence, Vali's

untimely claim that it now seeks interest as damages should not
even be considered by this Court.
Moreover, even if Vali could now assert a claim for
interest under the common law, it would not prevail because of
the general rule of extinguishment.

The law in Utah is clear

that "[p]rejudgment interest represents an amount awarded as
damages," L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Const. Co., Inc., 608
P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980) and that
where interest is payable merely as damages
for nonpayment of money when due, acceptance
of the principal amount bars any claim for
interest.
Cox Const. Co. v. State Road Comm., 583 P.2d 87 (Utah 1978).
Moreover, the authority relied upon by the Cox court indicates
that this is true even though the creditor receives the payment
of principal, without interest, under protest.

The rule barring

separate claims for interest is further explained in Point III
hereinafter.
Since Vali did accept payment of the principal in full,
Vali's claim for interest is barred and Vali cannot now maintain
a separate action for interest.
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POINT III
THE CASES RELIED ON BY VALI IN POINT I OF
ITS ARGUMENT ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT
CASE AND DO NOT JUSTIFY VALI'S CLAIM FOR
INTEREST UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-1.
The cases relied on by Vali in Point I of its Argument
are easily distinguishable from the case at bar.

One of the most

significant differences is that none of the cases relied on by
Vali involved a claim for interest on an amount that had been
determined by a compromise between the parties.

Rather, all of

the cases relied on by Vali involved a claim for interest on
either a principal amount that was uncontested or on the amount
of a liability that had been determined by the Court.
By way of contrast, payment of a compromised claim is
payment of a claim of questionable validity and enforceability.
Certainly, it would be unjust to assess interest on such a claim.
Though Vali has the burden of proof, it has not cited one case
where interest was claimed and ordered on a settlement amount
that had been determined by a compromise between the parties.
Indeed, it is highly doubtful that such a case exists, not only
because of the manifest injustice of assessing interest on a
questionable claim but also because when parties compromise and
settle their disputes, the compromise agreement is substituted
for the antecedent claim and the rights and liabilities of the
parties are measured and limited by the terms of the compromise
agreement, as is explained more fully hereinafter.
In trying to justify its claim that interest should be
paid on the settled amount, Vali points out that the law
generally encourages settlements.
-1 O .

Vali then seems to argue that

a ruling denying presettlement interest on the compromised amount
would fly in the face of the well-settled principle of law that
"settlements are favored in the law."
quite the opposite is true.

Respondent asserts that

The only way to encourage

settlements is to enforce them.

If the Court were to allow a

party to assert additional claims after a settlement had been
agreed to, surely that would have a chilling effect.

Certainly,

there is disincentive to compromise and settle if a party must
always wonder whether the opposing party will later assert a
claim for interest.

Moveover, a party would be disinclined to

agree to pay a questionable claim if there was always the
possibility that the other party could later hit him over the
head with interest.
If a claim for interest could be maintained after
entering into a settlement, the only way for a party to protect
himself from such uncertainty would be to inquire up front
whether the other party would like to claim interest.

Such would

be not only unfair but would also fly in the face of the wellsettled principle that each party is responsible to assert its
own claims.
Moreover, if a claim for interest were made up front,
prior to the settlement, it is quite possible that it would
affect the extent to which the payor was willing to compromise
the claim.

Indeed, in the present case, Mr. Brown, Vali's

principal, testified that he thought it would have been more
difficult to get a settlement if interest had been included in
the claim.

Formal Hearing Transcript, p. 61, lines 1-6.
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The law favors a policy of openness and honesty.

When

parties are negotiating a settlement, they should put all their
demands on the table before the compromise is accepted•

It is

not only unlawful, it is also manifestly unfair to allow one
party to impose an additional claim on the other after a
settlement has been reached.
Another difference between the two principal cases
relied on by Vali and the present case is that, in those cases,
the statutes relied upon by the courts specifically provided a
right to interest instead of just setting the legal rate as does
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1.

In United States v. Consolidated

Edison, 590 F. Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y 1984), the Court relied on N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Law S 5001 (McKinney 1963) which begins with the words
"Interest shall be recovered . . . ."

In Girard Trust Co. v.

United States, 270 U.S. 163 (1926), the Court relied upon a
United States statute that provided " . . . interest shall be
allowed and paid upon the total amount of such a refund . . . .H
42 Stat. 316 S 1324(a) (1921).

Hence, the statutes relied on in

both cases specifically provided a right to interest, whereas
Utah Code Ann. S 15-1-1 merely sets the legal rate.
Con. Ed. and Girard are the only cases cited by Vali
where a suit for interest was allowed after the principal had
been paid.

There is an additional distinction between those

cases and the present case that is significant.
As a general rule, if interest is due by the
terms of the contract, the payment of the
principal is no bar to its subsequent
recovery, but if it is not due by the terms
of the contract, the payment of the
principal sum is a bar to recovery.
-21-

45 Am. Jur. 2d, Interest and Usury, S 341 p. 259.
In finding that an action for interest could be
maintained after payment of the principal, the Con. Ed. Court
relied on that general rule, as evidenced by the following
language the Con. Ed. court quoted from the Girard decision:
[In Stewart] [t]his Court held that the
taxpayer could not maintain an independent
action for interest, for the reason that in
such cases interest is considered as damages,
does not form the basis of the action, and is
only an incident to the recovery of the
principal debt. We do not think that it
controls this case. The payment of interest in
the Stewart Case was not expressly provided for
in the Act. In this case there is statutory
provision for it, and it is analogous to a suit
in debt or covenant in which the contract
specifically provides for payment in interest
on the principal debt.
Con. Ed., p. 270.

Emphasis added.

Thus, in Con. Ed. and Girard,

not only was the principal amount uncontested, there were also
statutes that specifically provided for payment of interest.

The

Courts reasoned that those statutes were analogous to a contract
that specifically provides for the payment of interest.
Therefore payment of the principal would not bar a suit for
interest.

However, consistent with the general rule quoted

above, the Courts also noted that it was a different situation
than where interest was claimed as damages.
In the present case, the amount of the payment was a
compromised amount rather than an uncontested amount, the statute
(Utah Code Ann. S 15-1-1) does not specify a right to interest,
and the Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that prejudgment
interest is damages, as pointed out at page 18 hereinabove.
Hence, Girard and Con. Ed are inapplicable in the present case.
-22-

At page 11 of its brief, Vali states:
In reliance upon § 15-1-1, the Utah Supreme
Court has held that, MIn contract cases,
certainly, interest on amounts found to be due
in judicial proceedings is recovery to which
the creditor is entitled as a matter of law."
Liqnell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979).
Vali seems to suggest that the Court in Liqnell relied
on S 15-1-1 in determining that the creditor was entitled to
interest when in fact the Court relied on several cases, not on
the statute, to establish that right.

The Court did, however,

reference S 15-1-1 as setting the legal rate.
809.

See Lignell, p.

This, of course, is consistent with DHCF's argument as set

forth above.

Section 15-1-1 does not establish a right, but

merely sets the rate.
It should also be noted that the above-quoted language
from Lignell, by its own terms, applies only to "interest on
amounts found to be due in judicial proceedings."

Lignell makes

no reference to compromised claims.
Moreover, application of the Lignell rule in the
present case would not entitle Vali to recovery.

If a party pays

the principal in full, there is no principal owed, and the only
amount that can be "found to be due in judicial proceedings" is
zero.

Of course, interest on a zero amount is itself zero.
Citing Holmes v. Kewanne Oil Co., 664 P.2d 1335 (Kan.

S. Ct. 1983), Vali claims that equitable principals would entitle
Vali to interest "where a party retains and makes actual use of
money belonging to another."

Though that may be true, there is

no evidence in the present case that the money was retained and
used.

Indeed, the evidence shows that 73% of the settled amount
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was paid by the Federal Government.

Furthermore, since the

settlement amount was reached by compromise, it is questionable
whether the money "belonged to another" until the settlement was
agreed to.
It should also be noted that prejudgment interest is
denied where the claim is substantially inflated and a genuine
dispute exists between the parties as to the amount due since the
policy of the law is to discourage grossly inflated and
overstated claims.

Pappas v. Jack O.A. Nelsen Agency, Inc., 260

N.W.2d 271 (Wis. 1978).

As DHCF has previously pointed out, this

whole dispute was caused by the grossly overstated claims on
Vali's Facility Cost Profiles.

Even the final disallowance was a

whopping $708,000.00 on an allowed claim of about 3.2 million
dollars.

Hence, interest should not be allowed.
POINT IV
UTAH CODE ANN. S 15-6-1 DOES NOT APPLY
BECAUSE THERE WAS A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE
PARTIES
The second issue presented by Appellant in this appeal

is:
Is petitioner entitled to interest under the
Utah Prompt Payment Act (Utah Code Ann. SS
15-6-1 et seq.?
The Prompt Payment Act (copy attached as Exhibit A) is
an act providing for the payment of interest by the State on
delinquent accounts.

By its own terms, the Prompt Payment Act

does not apply where there is a dispute as to the amount due.
That act provides that if the agencies' failure to timely pay
is the result of a dispute between the
agency and the business over the amount due
-24-

or over compliance with the contract, the
provisions of this act are inapplicable."
Utah Code Ann. S 15-6-4 (1986 Replacement).

Hence, in this

action, the Third District Court ruled, at page five of its
Memorandum Decision of February 11, 1988, that the Prompt Payment
Act
is limited by Section 15-6-4, which renders the
interest provisions inapplicable if the failure
to timely pay is the result of a dispute.
There was here a dispute . . . Section 15-6-3
is therefore inapplicable.
Vali has argued that there is no dispute in this case
and that the Act therefore applies.

Such a position is

untenable.
When Vali submitted its FCPs in December 1979, those
i CPs were Vali's claims as to what expenses it claimed were
allowable Medicaid expenses for the purpose of setting Vali's
prospective payment rate.

Upon the recommendation of the

independent auditors who reviewed those FCPs, DHCF disputed the
amount claimed and disallowed a substantial portion of the amount
claimed.

Had there been no dispute, DHCF would not have made a

disallowance but would simply have accepted the figures Vali
claimed in its FCPs and used those figures in calculating Vali's
prospective payment rate.

There would have been no need for the

months of conferences and hearings.
accept those figures.

DHCF, however, did not

Rather, they disputed the amount claimed

by Vali.
On page 19 of Vali's Brief, Vali seems to infer that
the Administrative Law Judge (MALJ") considered the applicability
of the Prompt Payment Act and determined that there was "no
25-

legitimate dispute" and that the Department's interpretation of
what constitutes a dispute is "clearly unreasonable."
argument is misleading.

Vali's

The ALJ did not even mention the

applicability of the Prompt Payment Act in his findings,
conclusions and recommended decision.

The ALJ's decision was

based principally on the Procurement Code (Utah Code Ann. § 6356-1, et seq.), which the Third District Court found does not
apply in this case, and which finding Vali did not appeal to this
Court.

Furthermore, the Procurement Code (the statute relied on

by the ALJ) has no "dispute" provision.

Hence, the issue of

whether there was a dispute was not even considered by the ALJ.
There clearly was a dispute between the parties.

As

mentioned above, the informal hearing officer's proposed
settlement stated:
Both parties in this issue have indicated that
if they find this settlement satisfactory, they
will accept settlement at the administrative
hearing level. However, both parties reserved
the right to raise any of the issues discussed
in this hearing, or any related issues not
necessarily discussed in the informal hearing
level if the conflict cannot be resolved at the
administrative review level.
Moreover, when the owner of Vali accepted the proposed
settlement, he wrote:

"[T]his settlement, while compromised, is

a fair one and I appreciate your efforts in carrying it to this
point."

Statement of Facts herein, paragraph 18.
Were there no dispute, there would be no need for a

settlement.

Were there no dispute, there would be nothing to

compromise.

Furthermore, the fact that both parties reserved the

right to contest any of the issues if the hearing officer's
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settlement proposal was not accepted, is evidence that all issues
remained in dispute right up until the settlement proposal was
accepted in March of 1985. Most significantly, the very fact
that Vali compromised and settled the FCP's for over seven
hundred thousand dollars less than it originally claimed, and
called the settlement Ma fair one", is sufficient evidence by
itself that there was a dispute.
This case is simply not the type of case to which the
Prompt Payment Act applies.

The intent of that Act is to ensure

that the state agencies make timely payment of undisputed claims.
That Act clearly applies only in those situations where there is
no dispute as to the amount due and where the state agency is
simply delinquent in making payment of an uncontested amount.
When there is a dispute, a party may still seek interest under
the Procurement Code or pursuant to the common law, if either are
applicable, but the Prompt Payment Act does not apply.
There was a dispute in the present case and the Prompt
Payment Act is therefore inapplicable.
POINT V
THE SETTLEMENT ENTERED INTO BT THE PARTIES
BARS VALI'S CLAIM FOR INTEREST.
After months of negotiations between the parties in
their efforts to resolve their dispute without formal litigation,
the final session of the informal hearing took place on March 20,
1985.

At that meeting, the parties orally agreed to terms for

final settlement of their dispute.

Uncontroverted evidence shows

that at that meeting, Mr. Brown (the principal of Vali) affirmed
that the proposed settlement would "dispose of every claim which
-27-

[he had] against the Health Department" and that he would go his
way and the Department would go its way "without having to deal
with each other over money again."

Formal Hearing Transcript,

Exhibit S-l, paragraph 5.
After that meeting, the hearing officer put the terms
to which the parties had agreed into written form and proposed
them for Vali's approval as final settlement.

In that typed copy

of the settlement agreement, the hearing officer stated:

"I

propose the following as final settlement in the Vali Care and
Convalescent Center's issues."
Exhibits H & I, p. 6.

Formal Hearing Transcript,

Emphasis added.

The hearing officer then

set forth the terms and concluded "[i]f, as we discussed [the
settlement] is satisfactory to you, I would appreciate a letter
to that effect so we can begin the process of adjusting the rates
and generate a final warrant."
"I".

Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit

Emphasis added.
Mr. Brown picked up the hearing officer's proposal for

final settlement at the Health Department on March 22, 1985. On
that same day, Mr. Brown confirmed, in writing, his acceptance of
the Department's offer for final settlement by a letter in which
he wrote:
Mr. Don Hampton and I have reviewed the
contents of your letters of March 18 and 25
(picked up March 22) containing your findings
as informal hearing officer of the Valley Care
Center audit review.
Therein, you expressed a desire to expedite a
final resolve in these matters' so too do we.
Therefore, in an attempt to resolve without
further discussion at the administrative
hearing level; I am informing you of our
decision to accept your findings as contained
-28-

in the two (2) aforementioned letters. This
settlement, while compromised, is a fair one
and I appreciate your efforts in carrying it to
this point.
Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit HKM.

Emphasis added.

Thus, on March 20, 1985, the parties had agreed orally
to a settlement, and that oral agreement was confirmed in writing
by both parties on March 22, 1985.
Moreover, the parties do not even contest whether there
was a settlement agreement of some sort.

Indeed, Petitioners

argue that settlements are favored by the law.

The only real

disagreement between the parties is whether their settlement also
settled the question of interest.
The law is well settled that an offer of settlement
must be accepted on the terms in which the offer is made.
Watters v. Hedqpeth, 90 S.E. 314, 172 N.C. 310 (1916).
course, is not surprising.
law.

That, of

It is a basic principle of contract

When one party makes an offer, the other party may either

accept the offer, make a counter offer, or reject the offer.
The hearing officer's proposal, as quoted above, was a
proposal for final settlement.

Mr. Brown had the option to

accept that offer on the terms in which it was made (i.e. as
final settlement), to reject the offer, or to make a counter
offer.

He did not reject.

Nor did he make a counter offer.

simply accepted the offer as written,.

He

Thus, the parties had

entered an agreement for final settlement, and Mr. Brown had even
indicated that the settlement, while compromised, was a fair one.
As Vali has pointed out, the law favors settlement.
favors the finality of settlements.
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Holler v. Wallis, 573 P.2d

It

1302 (Wash. 1978).

Hence, Vali could not raise a new issue after

accepting the hearing officer's proposal for final settlement.
Another reason that Vali is not entitled to interest
for the period preceding the settlement agreement is that:
[a] valid compromise and settlement is final,
conclusive, and binding upon the parties . . .
and, regardless of what the actual merits of
the antecedent claim may have been, they will
not afterward be inquired into and examined . .
The compromise agreement is substituted for the
antecedent claim or right, and the rights and
liabilities of the parties are measured and
limited by the terms of the agreement. The
antecedent claim is extinguished, and
subsequent litigation based upon it is barred
by the compromise and settlement.
15a Am Jur 2d Compromise and Settlement §§ 24, 25.
Hence, because the settlement agreement extinguishes
the prior agreement and because the rights and liabilities of the
parties are determined by the settlement agreement, even if the
Court were to rule that the settlement agreement herein settled
only the principal amount, Vali would still be entitled to
interest on the settlement amount only from the date payment of
the settlement amount was due up to and including the date it was
paid.
The earliest that the settlement amount herein was due
was April 5, 1985 (the date the parties' accountants agreed on
the calculations).

The record shows that the Department did pay

interest on the settlement amount from that date up to the date
when payment of the settled amount was made on May 16, 1985.
Vali has no other enforceable claim for interest.
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CONCLUSION
Vali raised two issues on appeal, namely:
1.

Whether interest is awardable under Utah Code Ann.

S 15-1-1 where the principal sum due by contract is resolved by
the parties without entry of a formal judgment; and
2.

Whether petitioner is entitled to interest under

the Utah Prompt Payment Act (Utah Code Ann. SS 15-6-1, et seq.),
under the facts of this case.
As set forth above, S 15-1-1 in and of itself creates
no right or entitlement to interest, but rather merely sets the
rate that applies when there is a right to interest pursuant to
common law principles regarding prejudgment interest, and § 15-61 et seq. does not apply in this case because there was a dispute
between the parties.

Since neither statute relied upon by Vali

is applicable, Vali's appeal must fail.
Though Vali's claim for interest under the common law
is not timely and should not be considered by this Court, even if
it was timely, it would not entitle Vali to interest since the
well-settled rule of the common law provides that where interest
is sought pursuant to the common law rather than by a specific
contract right, a separate action for interest may not be
maintained and acceptance of the principal bars any claim for
interest.
Furthermore, because the parties compromised their
claims and entered a settlement agreement, Vali is only entitled
to interest from the time of the settlement to the time of
payment, which interest has already been paid to Vali.
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Settlements are favored in the law.

The settlement between the

parties ought to be enforced and no further claims allowed.
For the many reasons cited above, but especially
because Vali has no right to interest under the statutes it
relies on, Vali's appeal must fail*

DHCF respectfully requests

that the Final Determination of the Executive Director of the
Department of Health be affirmed, as was done by the Third
District Court, and that the relief requested by Vali be denied.
Respectfully submitted this

/

day of March, 1989.

BRIAN L. FARR
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
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EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A
PROMPT PAYMENT ACT

i 15-5-8

History: L. 1929, ch. 91, | 6; R.8.1933 4 C.
1943, 4744.

15-4-6. Death of joint obligor — Survivorship.
On the death of a joint obligor in contract his executor or administrator
shall be bound as such jointly and aeverally with the surviving obligor or
obligors.
Hiftory: L. 1929, ch. 61,1 * R.6.1933 * C.
1943, 4744.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. id. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts will, made pursuant to agreement at to disposiI 301.
tion of property at death, to dispose of such
CJS. — 17A CJ.S. Contract* f 353.
property during life, 85 A.L.R 3d 8.
AX.R. — Right of party to joint or mutual
Key Numbers. — Contracts e» 182(2).

15-4-7. Effective date of chapter.
This chapter shall not apply to obligations arising prior to July 1, 1929.
History: L. 1929, ch. 61,1 7; KB. 1933 * C.
1943, 47-0-7.

CHAPTER 5
REVOLVING CHARGE AGREEMENTS
(Repealed by Law. 1969, ch. 18, ft 9.103)

15-5-1 to 15-5-8. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section* 15-5-1 to 15-5-8 (L.
1965. eh 26, ft 1 to 8). relating to revolving

charge agreement*, were repealed by Law*
1969, ch. 18, I 9.103.

CHAPTER 6
PROMPT PAYMENT ACT
Section
16-6-1.
Short title.
l
^fl
Time for payment by 9UW ejendee.
16-&-3. Interest on payment* by eute afen-

Section
1*4-4. Disputed payment* excepted.
liV«. Contrscton'psymenU to suboontrex| o r f _ T i m t _ latest
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15-6-1

15-6-1.

CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL

Short tide.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Utah Prompt Payment
ActHistory: L. 1983, ch. 300, I 1.

1983. ch. 300, which enacted this section and

Meaning of "this act**. — The term "this
act," referred to in this section, refers to Laws

| | 15-6-2 to 15-6-5.

15-6-2. Time for payment by state agencies.
(1) An agency of the state of Utah which acquires property or services
pursuant to a contract with a business shall pay for each complete delivered
item of property or service on the date required by contract between such
business and agency or, if no date for payment is specified by contract, within
60 days after receipt of the invoice covering the delivered items or services.
(2) The acquisition of property includes the rental of real or personal property.
History: L. 1983, ch. 300, I 1.

15-6-3. Interest on payments by state agencies.
(1) Interest shall accrue and be charged on payments overdue under
§ 15-6-2 at the rate of 15.5% per annum beginning on the day after payment
is due, if the payment due date is specified by contract, or on the 61st day after
receipt of the invoice, if no payment date is specified by contract. Interest
ceases to accrue on the date payment is made.
(2) Any interest which remains unpaid at the end of any 60-day period or
which remains unpaid at the end of any specified period provided by contract
shall be added to the principal amount of the debt and shall thereafter accumulate interest.
(3) An agency of the state is prohibited from seeking additional appropriations to pay interest which accrues as a result of an agency's failure to make
payments as required by 5 15-6-2.
History: L 1983, ch. 300, • 3.

15-6-4. Disputed payments excepted.
If the agency's failure to timely pay interest as required by I 15-6-3 is the
result of a dispute between the agency and the business over the amount due
or over compliance with the contract, the provisions of this act are inapplicable.
History: L. IMS, ch. 300, I 4.
Meaning of "this act". — Set ths nots under this catchlin* under I 15-6-1.
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REGISTERED PUBLIC OBLIGATIONS ACT

15-7-2

15-6-5. Contractors9 payments to subcontractors — Time
— Interest
Upon payment by an agency of the state of Utah or by an agency of the
United States, a business which has acquired under contract, property or
services in connection with its contract with such an agency from a subcontractor or supplier, shall pay such subcontractor or supplier within 30 days
after payment from such agency. Interest at the rate of 15.5% per annum shall
accrue and is due any subcontractor or supplier who is not paid within 45 days
after the business receives payment from the agency, unless otherwise provided by contract between the business and the subcontractor or supplier.
Interest begins to accrue on the 31st day at the rate specified in this subsection.
History: L. 1963, ch. S00, I 6.

CHAPTER 7
REGISTERED PUBLIC OBLIGATIONS
ACT
Section
15.7-1.
15-7-2.
15-7-3.
15-7-4.
15-7-5.
15-7-6.
15-7-7.
15-7-S.
15-7-9.

Short title.
Definitions.
Purpose.
Registration system established by
issuer.
Execution of obligation*.
Signature* of officer*.
Seal*.
Agent* of iaauer.
Transfer cost* — Agreements as to
payment of costs.

Section
15-7-10. Investment of public funds in registered obligations of public entities of other states.
15-7-11. Registration records — Public inspection — Location.
15-7-12. Obligations subject to chapter.
15-7-13. Construction with other law.
15-7-14. Covenant against repeal of chapter.

15-7-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Registered Public Obligations Act."
History: L. 1983, eh. 62, | 1.
Meaning of "this set". — The term "this
act," referred to in this section, refers to Laws

1983, ch 62, which enacted this section and
| | 16-7-2 to 15-7-14.

15-7-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter
(1) "Authorized officer" means any individual required or permitted by
any law or by the issuing public entity to execute on behalf of the public
entity, a certificated registered public obligation or a writing relating to
an uncertificated registered public obligation.
(2) "Certificated registered public obligation" means a registered public obligation which is represented by an instrument
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